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On December 12, 2001, Congresswoman Jane Har-man (D-CA) introduced H.R. 3468, the ForeignTerrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of
2001 (Act), which would authorize the president to con-
vene military tribunals for trial outside the United States
of persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor lawful resi-
dent aliens, and who are apprehended in connection
with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States. The Act, currently pending in House of
Representatives committees, would serve to codify the
authority assumed by President George W. Bush in his
Executive Order of November 13, 2001. The Executive
Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism (Executive Order), autho-
rizes the trial of suspected terrorists by military commis-
sions. The Act provides that military tribunals would be
convened only outside the United States, and preserves
broad executive authority to specify the location of the tri-
bunals, the procedures to be employed, the suspects to be
tried, and the offenses with which they will be charged.
The Act requires that the president transmit to Congress
and to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a
semi-annual report specifying such details, and further
provides that the report be unclassified “to the extent pos-
sible.” The Act also includes a sunset provision, termi-
nating its authorization of military tribunals on Decem-
ber 31, 2005. Similar to President Bush’s Executive Order,
the Act pertains to individuals suspected of planning,
authorizing, committing, or aiding the September 11
attacks, as well as those suspected of harboring any orga-
nization or individual that planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the attacks. The Act expressly preserves
the right to petition for habeas corpus, providing that
“[n]othing in any military order, executive order, regu-
lation, or other directive of the executive branch may limit
the rights or privileges of any individual . . . relating to
habeas corpus.”
The legitimacy of trying suspected terrorists by military
tribunals has been debated fervently since President Bush’s
November decree. The Act, if passed, would partially rec-
tify Bush’s apparent attempt to deny those convicted by a
military tribunal the privilege “to seek any remedy or main-
tain any proceeding . . . in any court of the United States,”
by expressly prohibiting the executive branch from limit-
ing the constitutional writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless,
in limiting post-conviction remedies to habeas corpus, the
Act passively sustains the Executive Order’s denial of the
right to appeal a conviction by a military tribunal to an Arti-
cle III court. The Act is also silent on a variety of other lim-
itations embodied in the Executive Order concerning the
procedural rights of suspected terrorists. 
The Executive Order defines suspected terrorists as
those whom the president determines “there is reason to
believe” are or were members of al Qaida; engaged in,
aided or abetted, or conspired to commit international
acts of terrorism; or knowingly harbored one or more indi-
viduals meeting such descriptions. The Act fails to define
the standard of suspicion necessary to detain and try sus-
pected terrorists in military tribunals, passively support-
ing the “presidential determination of a ‘reason to
believe’” standard, which the Executive Order articu-
lates. Such a standard falls outside the realm of the more
familiar “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion”
benchmarks, and therefore lacks a basis for comparative
evaluation, rendering its reliability questionable.   
Additionally, although the Act requires that the presi-
dent report to Congress on the procedures used in any mil-
itary tribunal convened, it is silent on the broad procedural
guidelines articulated in Bush’s Executive Order. Specifi-
cally, the Executive Order embraces all evidence “of pro-
bative value to a reasonable person,” including hearsay
and evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution; it provides for a
determination of guilt by a two-thirds vote, as opposed to
the unanimous verdict required in U.S. jury trials; and it
also provides for a two-thirds vote for sentencing, includ-
ing capital sentences. Even military court martial pro-
ceedings require a three-fourths vote for a life sentence and
a unanimous vote to impose the death penalty.
The Act would passively sustain guidelines provided in
President Bush’s Executive Order for trying suspected ter-
rorists in military tribunals although they fail to meet
international standards for criminal prosecutions. For
example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the U.S. ratified in
1992, provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbi-
trary arrest or detention.” Similarly, it asserts, “[n]o one
shall be deprived of his liberty except . . . in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law.” The
arrest and detention of individuals on the basis of Presi-
dent Bush’s personal determination that there is “reason
to believe” they are terrorists; that they planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the September 11 attacks; or
that they harbored an organization or individual that so
planned, authorized, committed, or aided, may well be
arbitrary. Moreover, in diverging substantially from the
procedures established under U.S. federal and constitu-
tional law, and even from those established under U.S. mil-
itary law for courts martial, the procedures set forth in
Bush’s Executive Order violate the ICCPR.    
In defense of military tribunals, President Bush has
asserted that those who would be tried in such courts are
“unlawful combatants who seek to destroy our country and
our way of life.” Indeed, unlawful combatants, in contrast
to prisoners of war, lack due process protections under
the Geneva Conventions, which govern the laws of war.
International treaties, such as the ICCPR, however, are not
specific to certain persons, but rather protect the funda-
mental human rights of all persons. Moreover, the clas-
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sification of detainees as unlawful com-
batants, and not prisoners of war, is a
legal determination governed by the
1977 Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol 1). In particular, Arti-
cle 45 of Protocol 1 articulates a pre-
sumption that a person who partakes
in hostilities and falls into an adverse
party’s power is a prisoner of war, and
therefore protected by the Third
Geneva Convention “if he claims the
status of prisoner of war, or if he
appears to be entitled to such status, or
if the Party on which he depends
claims such status on his behalf . . . .”
Additionally, Protocol 1 provides that
where “any doubt arise[s] as to whether
any such person is entitled to the sta-
tus of prisoner of war, he shall con-
tinue to have such status, and there-
fore, to be protected by the Third
[Geneva] Convention and this Proto-
col until such time as his status has
been determined by a competent tri-
bunal (emphasis added).” Thus, Pres-
ident Bush’s ad hoc decision that indi-
viduals, whose guilt he determines
should be adjudicated by a military
commission, are unlawful combatants
is improper. An executive determina-
tion that detainees are unlawful com-
batants, rather than prisoners of war,
may in some instances violate the guar-
antee of a judicial determination of
such status codified in Protocol 1, and
in graver instances, this executive deter-
mination could violate humanitarian
protections guaranteed to prisoners
of war by the Geneva Conventions.
Importantly, trial by a military com-
mission of persons wrongfully denied
prisoner of war status would violate
Article 106 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
which provides that all prisoners of
war have the right of appeal or petition
from any sentence, in the same man-
ner as members of the armed forces of
the detaining power.
Prosecuting and punishing perpe-
trators of the September 11 attacks on
the United States is undoubtedly an
important and formidable task. Sacri-
ficing fundamental due process guar-
antees recognized under federal and
international law, however, carries
heavy consequences. Congressional
authorization of military tribunals
would constitute a great hypocrisy in
light of U.S. criticism of military tri-
bunals throughout the world, particu-
larly those in Peru, where the U.S.
Department of State criticized a mili-
tary trial of an American accused of
terrorism, demanding that the trial be
held “in open civilian court with full
rights of legal defense, in accordance
with international judicial norms.” In
light of these potential legal and polit-
ical consequences, it is critical that
Congress take additional steps to reg-
ulate the procedures employed in mil-
itary tribunals, and ensure that the
U.S. effort to protect itself from ter-
rorism does not result in seriously
undermining U.S. credibility through-
out the world. 
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